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NON-EQUIVALENT BELIEFS AND
SUBJECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM BUBBLES
MARTIN LARSSON
Abstract. This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model where agents exhibit a strong
form of belief heterogeneity: they disagree about zero probability events. It is shown that,
somewhat surprisingly, equilibrium exists in this setting, and that the disagreement about
nullsets naturally leads to equilibrium asset pricing bubbles. The bubbles are subjective
in the sense that they are perceived by some but not necessarily all agents. In contrast
to existing models, bubbles arise with no restrictions on trade beyond a standard solvency
constraint.
1. Introduction
Since the work of Santos and Woodford (1997) and Loewenstein and Willard (2000, 2006)
it is well understood that, under fairly broad economic assumptions, the equilibrium price
of an asset in positive net supply must equal its fundamental value, defined as the smallest
replication cost of the associated cash flows. Such models can therefore not be used to
describe rational asset pricing bubbles, defined as a wedge between the market price and
the fundamental value, as the result of an equilibrium mechanism. On the other hand, the
occurrence of bubbles in real markets makes it desirable to develop equilibrium models that
can accommodate them, and within which their properties can be analyzed. To date this has
been achieved by introducing market frictions, such as trading constraints, into the standard
setting. This prevents investors from exploiting or scaling up arbitrage opportunities, and
allows bubbles to persist (see below for a review of this literature.)
The present article deviates from the classical framework in a different manner. Instead of
being subjected to trading constraints, the agents are endowed with heterogeneous beliefs.
This heterogeneity is taken to a rather extreme degree: agents do not even agree about zero
probability events. It is far from clear from the outset that an equilibrium can exist in such
a setting; one objection will be discussed momentarily. Our first contribution is to show
that, somewhat surprisingly, this is indeed possible. Secondly, once the equilibrium has been
found, it is shown that asset pricing bubbles arise naturally.
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Regarding existence of equilibrium, a simple (but incorrect) argument can be given to suggest
that matters are hopeless. Suppose an equilibrium with two agents is given, where some
time T event D (“downturn”) is assigned positive probability by agent 1, but zero probability
by agent 2. Agent 1 is then willing to purchase insurance against D, say by buying an
indicator asset 1D at a positive price. Agent 2 is happy to supply this asset, since his
valuation of it is zero. But as the price is positive, agent 2 would like to scale up his position.
This violates individual optimality and contradicts the existence of equilibrium.
This argument has a key flaw. Because, in order to implement the suggested transaction, the
agents must trade dynamically over time to ensure that the correct amount is delivered at
time T . Agent 1 believes this amount will be either zero or one, whereas agent 2 is convinced
the amount will be zero. Nonetheless, the position of agent 2 may run intermediate deficits,
which prevents him from scaling up the position indefinitely without risking insolvency. This
is analogous to the well-known mechanism that allows bubbles to exist without violating
arbitrage restrictions. Of course, agent 2 will scale his position as much as possible, which
means that under certain scenarios he will come very close to insolvency—and if D does, in
fact, occur (even though agent 2 thought it impossible), he will go bankrupt. It turns out
that this last statement holds in full generality, and is what allows us to obtain a consistent
equilibrium; it enables us to deal with the otherwise uncomfortable question of what the agent
does when an event he thought was impossible nonetheless occurs. A detailed discussion of
this point is given in Section 2.3.
Once in equilibrium, the mechanism leading to bubbles can be understood as follows. An
agent computes the fundamental value of an asset as the smallest amount needed to replicate
its cash flows almost surely. However, when there is disagreement about nullsets, the notion
of “almost sure replication” varies between different agents. As a result it can happen that
an agent assigns zero probability to some scenarios that other agents believe are possible. In
this case, he does not have to replicate the cash flows in those scenarios, and is therefore able
to carry out the replication at a lower cost. This leads to disagreement about fundamental
values, and thus automatically to bubbles, since all agents must agree on the (endogenous
and observed) market price. Both bubbles and fundamental values are thus subjective in that
they depend on the beliefs of the agent computing them. It turns out that this dependence
is only through the nullsets. In particular this implies that no bubbles will be present if all
agents agree about nullsets, even if beliefs are otherwise heterogeneous.
As soon as equivalence of beliefs is dropped, a range of new phenomena appears. We analyze
some of these by means of various explicit examples. The “downturn” situation discussed
above is formalized in a setting where one agent is optimistic in the sense that he believes
the stock dividend cannot fall below some given level (see Section 4.1). This agent will then
try to exploit a perceived bubble by shorting the riskless asset and holding the stock as
collateral to avoid insolvency. If the dividend process nonetheless falls below the given level,
the agent goes bankrupt. The presence of bubbles implies that no equivalent martingale
measure exists relative to this agent’s beliefs. However, the other agent does not see any
bubbles, and for him an equivalent (true) martingale measure can be found. Section 4.2
contains a variation on the same theme. We also study an economy with two agents, where
3both agents simultaneously perceive bubbles (see Section 4.3). In this setting the bubble can
either persist until one of the agents goes bankrupt, or burst at an earlier point in time. A
fourth example (Section 4.4) is concerned with a two-agent, two-stock economy, where both
agents perceive bubbles. Here an additional interesting phenomenon occurs: not only do
the two agents agree about the existence of a bubble, they also agree about the statistical
properties of the bubble on the market portfolio, in the sense that its (unconditional) law is
the same under the two agents’ beliefs.
Let us give a brief overview of some related literature. The paper most closely related to
ours is (Hugonnier, 2012), where it is shown that rational asset pricing bubbles can arise in
equilibria where some, but not all, agents face restrictions on trade. In a similar vein, there
are several papers where portfolio constraints lead to mispricings, for instance (Cuoco, 2004;
Basak and Cuoco, 1998; Basak and Croitoru, 2000). Without such constraints, and with
homogenous beliefs, bubbles are not possible as long as agents must maintain nonnegative
wealth, see (Loewenstein and Willard, 2000). In the present paper, bubbles arise without
any restrictions on trade, other than the nonnegative wealth restriction.
Another line of research considers exogenously specified arbitrage-free models for asset prices.
Here bubbles (or relative arbitrage) occur by construction, without any equilibrium mecha-
nism justifying their presence. Representative papers include (Sin, 1998; Heston et al., 2007;
Jarrow et al., 2006, 2010; Fernholz et al., 2005; Fernholz and Karatzas, 2010; Ruf, 2011).
Our results have consequences for the interpretation of this type of models, since bubbles are
subjective in our setting: some agents perceive them, while others do not. The appearance
of bubbles in a given asset pricing model could therefore in principle be due to a misspec-
ification of the historical probability measure, assigning zero probability to scenarios (such
as defaults or market crashes) that may in fact not be impossible events. The present paper
should be viewed as a contribution toward understanding to what extent such exogenously
specified pricing models are supported by equilibrium price formation mechanisms.
A third line of research is a large body of work dealing with general equilibrium models
with heterogeneous beliefs, a small sample of which is (Basak, 2000, 2005; Berrada et al.,
2007; Jouini and Napp, 2007; Cvitanic´ et al., 2012). However, all these papers assume that
agents agree about zero probability events, with the consequence that no bubbles occur.
Non-equivalent beliefs occur in (Epstein and Ji, 2013) in the context of ambiguous volatility,
although the setting of that paper is very different from ours.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup and the
resulting equilibrium. An important issue in the context of non-equivalent beliefs is that
some agents may become insolvent in finite time. This leads us to introduce the notion of
No Resurrection. Section 3 discusses the occurrence of bubbles, in particular making precise
the concept of subjective bubbles. Section 4 is devoted to examples, and Section 5 concludes.
All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Throughout this paper we work on a probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) equipped with a filtration
(Ft)0≤t≤T for a bounded time set [0, T ], generated by some n-dimensional Brownian motion
X = (X1, . . . , Xn). Expectation under P is denoted E[ · ], and we use the shorthand notation
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Et[ · ] = E[ · | Ft]. For integrable functions f we write
∫ b
a
f(s)ds =
∫
[a,b)
f(s)ds. In particular,
this quantity is equal to zero whenever b ≤ a.
2. Equilibrium with non-equivalent beliefs
We consider a multi-agent economy with heterogeneous beliefs, where the agents may dis-
agree about zero-probability events. To a large extent this material parallels well-known
developments. However, there are certain delicate points arising from the non-equivalence
of beliefs that will be commented on in some detail. It should be emphasized that the belief
heterogeneity is the only point where our model differs from standard dynamic equilibrium
models with intermediate consumption as described, for instance, in (Duffie, 2001).
2.1. Agents and preferences. Finitely many agents, indexed by k = 1, 2, . . . , K, maximize
expected utility from consumption over the time interval [0, T ]. The preferences of agent k
are given by his beliefs, determined by a probability measure Pk ≪ P, a time preference rate
ρ > 0 (which for simplicity we take to be the same for all agents), and a utility function
uk : (0,∞) → R. It is assumed that uk is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and satisfies Inada conditions at zero and infinity. These assumptions are
standard. The utility agent k achieves from a consumption plan c = (ct)0≤t≤T is given
by
Uk(c) = E
k
[∫ T
0
e−ρtuk(ct)dt
]
,
whenever the right side is well-defined, and −∞ otherwise. Here Ek[ · ] denotes expectation
under Pk. This preference structure is standard, with the exception that P ≪ Pk is not
assumed. Similarly, we do not impose any absolute continuity relationship between Pk and
Pℓ for k 6= ℓ. This is what drives all the subsequent results on equilibrium bubbles.
Before describing the consumption plans and investment strategies available to the agents,
we establish some notation regarding the agents’ beliefs. Let
Zkt = Et
[
dPk
dP
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
be the density process associated with Pk, and define
τk = inf {t ∈ [0, T ] : Zkt = 0} .
(As usual, we set inf ∅ = ∞.) While it is by no means clear at this stage, it will be shown
later on that τk corresponds to a bankruptcy time of agent k. It is easy to verify that
P(τk ≤ T ) > 0 holds if and only if Pk and P are not equivalent, and that
(2.1) Pk |Ft∩{t<τk} ∼ P |Ft∩{t<τk} holds for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Heuristically this means that Pk and P are “equivalent strictly prior to τk”. This will often
let us deduce that various properties of interest hold for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Pk-a.s., if and only if
they hold for all 0 ≤ t < τk, P-a.s. Next, notice that we have
(2.2) Pk(τk ≤ T ) = E
[
ZkT1{τk≤T}
]
= 0.
5Due to the interpretation alluded to above of τk as a bankruptcy time, this simple means
that agent k believes that he will never become bankrupt. The following assumption will
always be in force.
Assumption 1. We have P(maxk τk =∞) = 1.
Given the above interpretation of τk, this assumption means that there is always some
agent who remains solvent up to time T . Note that this does not exclude situations where
P(τk ≤ T ) > 0 for all k, as long as in every state of world, there is some k (depending on
the state) for which τk =∞. Assumption 1 is not a real restriction, since it can be achieved
by replacing P by (P1 + · · ·+ PK)/K.
2.2. Assets and strategies. We now describe the consumption plans and investment strate-
gies available to the agents. The framework is again standard, apart from the disagreement
about nullsets. The financial market consists of n stocks in unit net supply, and a money
market account in zero net supply. The i:th stock is a claim on a dividend rate process
Di = (Dit)0≤t≤T , whose dynamics is given by
Dit = Di0 +
∫ t
0
Disaisds+
∫ t
0
Disv
⊤
isdXs,
for an exogenously given R-valued drift ai = (ait)0≤t≤T and R
n-valued volatility vi =
(vit)0≤t≤T , assumed to satisfy the integrability condition
(2.3)
∫ T
0
(
|ait|+ ‖vit‖
2
)
dt <∞ P-a.s.
This implies that the dividend processes are strictly positive. So is the aggregate dividend
rateD = (Dt)0≤t≤T , defined by Dt = D1t+· · ·+Dnt, which consequently can be written
(2.4) Dt =
n∑
i=1
Dit = D0 +
∫ t
0
Dsasds +
∫ t
0
Dsv
⊤
s dXs
for some drift a = (at)0≤t≤T and volatility vector v = (vt)0≤t≤T .
The market prices S = (S1t, . . . , Snt)0≤t≤T of the stocks, as well as the risk-free rate r =
(rt)0≤t≤T , are determined endogenously in equilibrium; the former within the class of Itoˆ
processes of the form
(2.5) Sit +
∫ t
0
Disds = Si0 +
∫ t
0
Sisµisds +
∫ t
0
Sisσ
⊤
isdXs, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
with the integrability condition∫ T
0
(
|rr|+ ‖µt‖+ trace(σtσ
⊤
t )
)
dt <∞ P-a.s.
Here µt = (µ1t, . . . , µnt), and σt is the matrix with rows σ
⊤
it . We let
(2.6) S0t = exp
(∫ t
0
rsds
)
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denote the value of the money market account. The market portfolio is denoted
St = S1t + · · ·+ Snt.
We focus on equilibria where the market is complete. In the present setting where the number
of Brownian motions coincides with the number of risky assets, this corresponds to σt being
invertible P⊗ dt-a.e. This leads to a unique market price of risk given by
θt = σ
−1
t (µt − rt1),
∫ T
0
‖θt‖
2dt <∞ P-a.s.
The associated (possibly non-normalized) state price density is
(2.7) ξt = ξ0 exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rsds−
∫ t
0
θ⊤s dXs −
1
2
∫ t
0
‖θs‖
2ds
)
,
whose characteristic property is that the deflated cum-dividend stock prices are local mar-
tingales; Indeed, by Itoˆ’s formula,
(2.8) ξtSit +
∫ t
0
ξsDisds is a local P-martingale.
While it will turn out that limited arbitrage opportunities may exist in equilibrium, we can
always safely assume that a market price of risk process and state price density as above
exist, since this is a minimal condition under which the agents’ utility maximization problems
will have optimal solutions with finite optimal value; see (Karatzas and Shreve, 1998; Duffie,
2001), as well as (Karatzas and Kardaras, 2007) for a thorough discussion. We write ξkt for
the k:th agent’s state price density, which is only defined prior to τk. It is given by
(2.9) ξkt =
ξt
Zkt
, 0 ≤ t < τk.
Due to (2.1) this implies that it is defined for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Pk-a.s. In view of (2.8),
Bayes’ rule (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix) implies that ξktSit +
∫ t
0
ξksDisds is a local Pk-
martingale.
A trading strategy is a pair (φ, π) = (φt, πt)0≤t≤T of predictable processes, where φt is the
amount invested in the money market account at time t, while πt = (π
1
t , . . . , π
n
t ) gives the
amounts invested in the stocks. These processes are required to satisfy∫ T
0
(
|φsrs + π
⊤
s µks|+ ‖σ
⊤
s πs‖
2
)
ds <∞ Pk-a.s.,
where µk is the drift vector of the stocks under Pk, obtainable via Girsanov’s theorem
1 (note
that the volatility is unaffected by absolutely continuous changes of probability measure.) If
the associated wealth process is nonnegative,
Wt(φ, π) = φt + 1
⊤πt ≥ 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, Pk-a.s.,
1By (Protter, 2005, Theorem III.41), it is given in terms of µ, σ, and Zk by µkt = µt +Z
−1
kt σt
d〈X,Zk〉t
dt
for
t ∈ [0, T ], Pk-a.s.
7the strategy is called Pk-admissible. Given a consumption plan c ≥ 0, a time point t0 ∈ [0, T ],
and an Ft0-measurable random variable Wt0 (the time t0 wealth), a strategy (φ, π) is called
Pk-self-financing if its wealth process satisfies
2
(2.10) Wt(φ, π) =Wt0 +
∫ t
t0
(φsrs + π
⊤
s µs − cs)ds+
∫ t
t0
π⊤s σsdXs, t0 ≤ t ≤ T, Pk-a.s.
A consumption plan for which such a strategy (φ, π) exists is called Pk-feasible (given time t0
wealth Wt0), and is said to be financed by (φ, π).
3 Note that above notions really depend
on Pk in general. However, this dependence is only through the nullsets, and is not present
if all Pk are equivalent. In this case all agents have access to the same set of strategies.
The following (essentially standard) result characterizes the class of Pk-feasible consumption
plans in terms of a static budget constraint.
Proposition 1. (i) A consumption plan c = (ct)0≤t≤T is Pk-feasible given time t0 wealth Wt0
if and only if
1
ξkt0
Ekt0
[∫ T
t0
ξkscsds
]
≤ Wt0 , Pk-a.s.
(ii) Let CT be a nonnegative FT -measurable random. There exists a Pk-self-financing strategy
(with zero consumption and time t0 wealth Wt0) such that its wealth process W satisfies
WT = CT if and only if
1
ξkt0
Ekt0 [ξkTCT ] ≤ Wt0 , Pk-a.s.
The k:th agent is endowed with some positive initial wealth wk > 0, which comes in the
form of αk0 units of the riskless asset, and αk = (αk1, . . . , αkn) units (nonnegative) of the
stocks. To ensure compatibility with market clearing, we require α10 + · · · + αK0 = 0,
α1i + · · · + αKi = 1, i = 1, . . . , n. The agent maximizes his expected utility Uk(c) over all
Pk-feasible consumption plans c, given initial wealth wk. In view of Proposition 1, the k:th
agent’s optimization problem is:
max
c≥0
Ek
[∫ T
0
e−ρtuk(ct)dt
]
s.t.
1
ξk0
Ek
[∫ T
0
ξktctdt
]
≤ wk.
2.3. Individual optimality and No Resurrection. Two important issues that arise in
the context of non-equivalent beliefs are addressed in this subsection.
The first concern is the following. Since Pk(τk ≤ T ) = 0, the k:th agent cannot distinguish
between consumption plans that only differ for t ≥ τk (and similarly for trading strategies).
The resulting non-uniqueness of optimizers is troubling: if τk < T , the economic activities
2An equivalent condition is obtained by replacing µ by µk, and X by X
k = X −
∫
Z−1s d〈X,Zk〉, which is
n-dimensional Brownian motion under Pk.
3One could replace the admissibility condition by suitable integrability requirements that guarantee that
ξktWt(φ, pi) +
∫ t
0
ξksWs(φ, pi)ds is a martingale under Pk. However, as discussed in (Hugonnier, 2012, Foot-
note 7), the resulting equilibrium is not affected by such a modification.
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continue after τk, and the actions of the k:th agent do influence the equilibrium. This
necessitates some rule for determining the actions of agent k after τk.
The need for such a rule is reinforced by our second concern, which arises from the following
fact: The optimal consumption plan is fixed by the agent at time 0, when he does not believe
τk can ever occur. If nonetheless τk does occur, it seems unsatisfactory to force the agent to
insist on his belief that τk cannot happen. It would be more reasonable for him to revise his
beliefs, and continue trading. But how should these new beliefs be determined? And even
if a compelling choice is possible, why did the agent from the outset fail to anticipate the
potential need for these new beliefs?
Fortunately there is a simple and natural way to resolve these issues. It relies on the following
result, which characterizes the optimal solution to the utility maximization problem faced
by agent k.
Proposition 2. An optimal Pk-feasible consumption plan for the k:th agent’s optimization
problem is given by
(2.11) ckt = Ik
(
ykξkte
ρt
)
1{t<τk},
where Ik = (u
′
k)
−1, and yk is chosen so that ξ
−1
k0 E
k[
∫ T
0
ξktcktdt] = wk (this is always possible.)
The corresponding wealth process satisfies
(2.12) Wkt =
1
ξkt
Ekt
[∫ T
t
ξkscksds
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, Pk-a.s.
The optimizer ck is unique up to Pk ⊗ dt-a.e. equivalence.
This result has the following consequence, which establishes our previous claim that τk plays
the role of the time of bankruptcy of agent k.
Corollary 1. Let ck be any optimal consumption plan for the k:th agent’s optimization
problem, and let Wk be the corresponding wealth process. We then have
lim
t↑τk
ckt = lim
t↑τk
Wkt = 0, P-a.s. on {τk ≤ T}.
Corollary 1 shows that the k:th agent will become bankrupt as t reaches τk, and that his
consumption will decrease to zero. This “should” imply that the wealth process is absorbed,
since no external capital injections take place. This in turn would force the agent to stop
consuming and to stop trading. The next result shows that this intuition is correct, if we
require that the strategy employed by agent k be self-financing and admissible with respect
to P, not just Pk. The result also shows that the optimal consumption plan given by (2.11)
indeed has this property.
Proposition 3. (i) Let c be any Pk-feasible consumption plan that is optimal for agent k.
If in addition c is P-feasible, financed by (φ, π), with wealth process W , then the following
No Resurrection property holds P⊗ dt-a.e. on [τk, T ]:
Wt = 0, ct = 0, φt = 0, πt = 0.
(ii) The Pk-feasible consumption plan ck given in (2.11) is P-feasible.
9Note that Corollary 1 shows that there can be no “positive surprises” for an agent when
his beliefs are proven wrong. That is, if an event that was initially deemed impossible
nonetheless occurs, the agent will never see a surprise increase in wealth—he will always
become insolvent. This fact has nothing to do with equilibrium, but is rather a consequence
of the structure of the optimal consumption plan and trading strategy.
2.4. Equilibrium. The preceding results show that the k:th agent’s actions after τk are
pinned down in a very natural way: If his consumption is to remain “globally” feasible (i.e.,
feasible under P), he must cease to consume and to trade. On the other hand, we have
also seen that requiring P-feasibility does not affect the optimal behavior before τk. This
motivates the following definition of equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is a set of price processes (S0, S) of the form (2.5)
and (2.6), together with consumption plans and trading strategies {ck, (φk, πk) : k = 1, . . . , K}
such that the following conditions hold:
(i) Optimality: For each k, ck is optimal for agent k, P-feasible, and financed by (φk, πk).
(ii) Market clearing: φ1 + · · ·+ φK = 0, π1 + · · ·+ πK = S, c1 + · · ·+ cK = D.
We can now solve for equilibrium using the same well-known procedure as in the classical
case with homogeneous beliefs (or heterogeneous but equivalent beliefs). We therefore only
give a rough outline. It is always understood that Assumption 1 is satisfied.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the optimal consumption plans are given by the first order
condition (2.11). Summing over k, imposing market clearing, and using the expression (2.9)
for ξk, yields
(2.13) Dt =
∑
k : t<τk
Ik
(
1
Zkt
yke
ρtξt
)
.
Now define
Φ(y; ν1, . . . , νK) =
∑
k : νk>0
Ik
(
y
νk
)
and let x 7→ Φ−1(x; ν1, . . . , νK) be the inverse of y 7→ Φ(y; ν1, . . . , νK). Provided not all νk are
zero, the Inada conditions imply that the inverse exists (see also the discussion in (Karatzas
and Shreve, 1998, page 172).) In view of (2.13) we obtain
(2.14) ξt = Φ
−1
(
Dt;
Zkt
ykeρt
: k = 1, . . . , K
)
.
As long as the right side is a strictly positive continuous semimartingale with absolutely
continuous drift, it defines a valid candidate state price density ξt. Substituting it back
into the agents’ budget constraints (which are binding by Proposition 2) yields a system
of equations for y1, . . . , yK, whose solution completely specifies ξt. This in turn yields the
interest rate and market price of risk via (2.7). Existence and uniqueness of y1, . . . , yK can be
treated as in the classical case, see for instance (Karatzas and Shreve, 1998) or (Basak, 2000).
In the examples we consider below, the solution is found explicitly. Given the state price
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density, the equilibrium stock prices can be computed; the result is given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the stock prices are given by
(2.15) Sit =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T
t
ξsDisds
]
,
which is automatically of the form (2.5). The value of the market portfolio is
(2.16) St =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T
t
ξsDsds
]
.
At this point we have obtained a candidate state price density ξ and candidate market
prices Si, as well as optimal wealth processes Wk and consumption plans ck that satisfy
W1 + · · · +Wk = S and c1 + · · · + cK = D by construction. It therefore only remains to
verify that the market is complete (i.e., σt is P ⊗ dt-a.e. invertible), and that the optimal
trading strategies (φk, πk) satisfy market clearing. The question of endogenous completeness
is a difficult one, although some results in this direction are available, see (Anderson and
Raimondo, 2008; Hugonnier et al., 2012; Kramkov, 2013). We do not discuss it further
here. As for market clearing of strategies, this is a consequence of market clearing of wealth
processes in the presence of market completeness. The well-known proof of this fact is
omitted.
Note that we may view the state price density ξt as arising from a representative agent with
stochastic marginal utility U ′t(x) = Φ
−1(x;Zkte
−ρt/yk : k = 1, . . . , K) and beliefs P. It may
or may not be possible to construct new beliefs P˜ ∼ P and a deterministic representative
utility function U˜(x) that result in the same state price density ξt. This topic is discussed
in (Jouini and Napp, 2007).
Example 1 (Logarithmic investors). Suppose uk(·) = log(·) for all k. In this case one can
provide explicit expressions for many equilibrium quantities of interest. As expected, these
expressions are identical to the ones obtained in the case of heterogeneous but equivalent
beliefs, see (Basak, 2005). Proofs of the following statements are given in the Appendix.
The “reference” state price density is given by
(2.17) ξt =
1
Dtη(0)
e−ρt (w1Z1t + · · ·+ wKZKt) ,
where we define
(2.18) η(t) =
1− e−ρ(T−t)
ρ
.
The equilibrium value of the market portfolio is
(2.19) St = Dt
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)ds = Dtη(t),
11
as is typical in models with logarithmic investors. The equilibrium consumption and wealth
processes for the k:th agent are given by
(2.20) ckt =
wk
eρtξktη(0)
, 0 ≤ t < τk
and
(2.21) Wkt = cktη(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Finally, we consider the interest rate rt and market prices of risk θt and θkt. Since w1Z1t +
· · ·+wKZKt is a positive martingale, there exists an X-integrable process γ = (γt)0≤t≤T such
that
(2.22) w1Z1t + · · ·+ wKZKt = (w1 + · · ·+ wK)E
(∫
γ⊤s dXs
)
t
,
where E (·)t denotes stochastic exponential. In terms of the process γ we have
(2.23) rt = ρ+ at − v
⊤
t (vt − γt) and θt = vt − γt.
Moreover, we have
(2.24) Zkt = E
(∫
γ⊤ksdXs
)
t
for some process γk = (γkt)0≤t<τk that satisfies, P-a.s.,
(2.25)
∫ t
0
‖γks‖
2ds <∞ for t < τk, but
∫ τk
0
‖γks‖
2ds =∞.
The individual state price density of the k:th agent is then given by
(2.26) θkt = θt + γkt = vt − γt + γkt, t < τk.
3. Equilibrium bubbles
The equilibrium setting with non-equivalent beliefs described above gives rise to bubbles
in equilibrium which are subjective in the sense that only some agents perceive them to be
present. This section discusses this phenomenon. We first introduce the fundamental value
at time t of a cash flow c: it is the minimal amount needed at t to replicate that cash flow
almost surely over the time interval [t, T ] using a self-financing admissible strategy. This
definition is standard is a complete market setting, see e.g. (Loewenstein and Willard, 2000;
Jarrow et al., 2006; Heston et al., 2007; Hugonnier, 2012). Since different agents may have
different nullsets, their notion of fundamental value may differ as well. With this in mind,
the fundamental value under Pk is the minimal time t wealth for which c becomes Pk-feasible
over [t, T ]. We denote this quantity by F kt (c). By Proposition 1 and Equation (2.1) it is
given by
F kt (c) =
1
ξkt
Ekt
[∫ T
t
ξkscsds
]
, 0 ≤ t < τk, P-a.s.
The fundamental value after τk is left undefined. We denote by Ft(c) the fundamental value
computed under the reference measure P.
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The bubble associated with a dividend-paying traded asset is defined as the difference between
its market price, given endogenously in equilibrium, and its fundamental value. The bubbles
on the stocks and the market portfolio, as perceived by the k:th agent, are thus given by
Bkit = Sit − F
k
t (Di), B
k
t = St − F
k
t (D).
A similar analysis is valid for the riskless asset. Indeed, it can be viewed as derivative
paying S0T at time T with no intermediate cash flows. By Proposition 1 and Equation (2.1)
its fundamental value and bubble, which we denote by F k0t and B
k
0t, respectively, are given
by
F k0t =
1
ξkt
Ekt [ξkTS0T ] , B
k
0t = S0t − F
k
0t.
A detailed discussion of why the presence of bubbles is in fact consistent with optimal choice
and absence of (unlimited) arbitrage is given in (Hugonnier, 2012, Section 3).
The expressions for the fundamental values and bubbles suggest that different agents could
perceive different bubbles. It is in this sense bubbles are subjective: they depend on the agent
through his beliefs. However, this dependence is confined to the nullsets since, whenever two
agents agree about zero probability events, they also agree about the size of the bubbles. This
is one consequence of the following theorem, which gives the relation between fundamental
values, and hence bubbles, computed under different beliefs.
Theorem 1. The fundamental value under P of a cash flow c can be decomposed as follows,
for each k = 1, . . .K:
Ft(c) = F
k
t (c) +
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T
τk
ξscsds
]
, 0 ≤ t < τk, P-a.s.
The interpretation of this decomposition is simple: the net present value calculation con-
ducted by agent k takes fewer payments into account; indeed, it only includes cash flows prior
to τk (which is of course equal to infinity almost surely under Pk, see (2.2).) In particular,
a traded asset whose dividend stream continues after τk will be perceived as overvalued by
agent k. This is (typically) the case both for the risk-free asset and the stocks, implying that
their prices will have bubble components.
The following results are immediate consequences of the theorem. The first one states
that each agent will invest in such a way that his portfolio is free from bubbles, from the
perspective of his own beliefs. This is as it should be, since the agent would otherwise
be throwing away wealth by partially investing in a suicide strategy. The second corollary
shows that fewer nullsets means larger perceived bubbles. Finally, the third corollary gives
an expression for the equilibrium bubbles on the traded assets.
Corollary 2. Each equilibrium wealth process Wk has no bubble component when viewed
either under P or under Pk.
Corollary 3. If τk ≤ τℓ (i.e. if Pk ≪ Pℓ), then B
k
it ≥ B
ℓ
it for 0 ≤ t < τk, P-a.s.
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Corollary 4. The bubbles on the individual stocks, the market portfolio, and the riskless
asset, as perceived by the k:th agent, are given by
Bkit =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T
τk
ξsDisds
]
, B
k
t =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T
τk
ξsDsds
]
,
Bk0t = S0t
(
1− Ekt
[
ξkTS0T
ξktS0t
])
.
We emphasize that heterogeneous beliefs need not induce bubbles. Rather, bubbles appear
when there is disagreement about nullsets. Moreover, while agents can disagree about the
size of a bubble, they can still agree that a bubble is present (unless there is only one agent
left in the economy): this happens when Pk(τk ≤ T ) > 0 for all k, which is of course in no
way incompatible with Assumption 1. Examples of this kind will be discussed below.
Example 2. Consider again the setting in Example 1 with logarithmic investors, and assume
that there are only K = 2 agents in the economy. Corollary 4 then shows that the subjective
bubbles on the market portfolio are given by
B
k
t =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T
τk
e−ρs
η(0)
(w1Z1s + w2Z2s) ds
]
=
wℓ
ξtη(0)
Et
[∫ T
τk
e−ρsZℓsds
]
, t < τk,
where ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, ℓ 6= k. For the second equality we used that Zks = 0 for s ≥ τk.
3.1. No Arbitrage conditions and equivalent martingale measures. We now com-
ment briefly on the question of equivalent martingale measures. In the present setting, an
equivalent local martingale measure (ELMM) for agent k is a probability measure Q ∼ Pk
such that the discounted cum-dividend stock price processes,
Sit
S0t
+
∫ t
0
Dis
S0s
ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
are local martingales with respect to Q. If these processes become true martingales, Q is
called an equivalent martingale measure (EMM). The existence of ELMMs and/or EMMs
are closely related to various conditions of no-arbitrage type: existence of an ELMM is
equivalent to the condition NFLVR (“No Free Lunch With Vanishing Risk”, see Delbaen and
Schachermayer (1994, 1998)), while existence of an EMM is equivalent to NFLVR together
with Merton’s No Dominance condition (see Loewenstein and Willard (2000) and Jarrow
and Larsson (2012) for a discussion of this fact and connections to market efficiency.) In the
complete market case, it is well understood that the existence of asset pricing bubbles on
the stock prices is consistent with NFLVR, but not with No Dominance.
The situation regarding bubbles on the riskless asset is different. In the complete market
setting, the only candidate density process for an ELMM is the local martingale ξktS0t.
Hence, in view of Corollary 4, the presence of a nonzero bubble on the riskless asset precludes
ξktS0t from being a true martingale, and thus from being the density process of an equivalent
probability measure. It follows that no ELMM can exist, and that NFLVR fails. Nonetheless,
the market can be in equilibrium. However, since a state price density ξkt exists, the weaker
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condition of “No Arbitrage of the First Kind”, or “No Unbounded Profit with Bounded
Risk” are satisfied, see (Karatzas and Kardaras, 2007). This condition, without which utility
maximization cannot be done, is thus also necessary and sometimes sufficient for equilibrium
to be possible.
3.2. Historical probability measures. From an econometric point of view one would like
to single out a particular probability measure P∗ as the historical or objective probability
measure, which at least in principle can be identified via statistical methods using a suffi-
ciently long time series of observations of the underlying economic variables. In our setting
the choice of P∗ becomes particularly delicate, as the choice of nullsets is ambiguous. Indeed,
the meaning of (2.1) is precisely that prior to τk, no statistical method can decide whether
{τk ≤ T} is a nullset or not.
For this reason, the model can be interpreted in different ways: P could be taken as the
historical measure, but any of the Pk would also be a valid choice. Depending on which
choice is made, different agents will be “wrong” in their beliefs. Once P∗ has been chosen, it
also becomes possible to classify bubbles as “illusory” or “real”. For example, in a two-agent
situation where P1 ≪ P2, agent 1 perceives a bubble while agent 2 does not. If we take
P∗ = P2, then the bubble perceived by agent 1 is fictitious in the sense that the (limited)
arbitrage he perceives is illusory and arises from the failure to account for certain catastrophic
scenarios. If, on the other hand, we take P∗ = P1, then there is indeed limited arbitrage, this
time caused by the unnecessarily cautious behavior of agent 2, who hedges against scenarios
that will never occur. Illusory arbitrage in the context of performance evaluation is discussed
in (Jarrow and Protter, 2013).
4. Examples
In this section we give several examples of economies where agents disagree about nullsets,
and asset price bubbles are present. We also discuss the nature of the trading strategies
that lead to bankruptcy of an agent k on the event {τk ≤ T}. In order to make the
examples as explicit as possible, we always consider two agents with logarithmic utilities
u1(x) = u2(x) = log(x).
4.1. One risky asset, the first agent optimistic. Let us consider an economy with
one risky asset, where the first agent is optimistic about the future dividend stream of the
asset, while the second agent has “neutral” views. The dividend process follows a geometric
Brownian motion,
Dt = D0 exp
(
vXt −
v2
2
t
)
,
where X is Brownian motion under P, and D0 > 1, v > 0. Let τ1 be the first time Dt hits
one,
(4.1) τ1 = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Dt = 1},
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and define
Z1t =
Dt∧τ1 − 1
D0 − 1
.
This is a nonnegative martingale starting at Z10 = 1, so we may define the beliefs of agent 1
by dP1 = Z1TdP. The beliefs of agent 2 are given by P2 = P. This gives an economy and a
beliefs structure that fits into the general framework developed above, where P1 ≪ P2 holds
but equivalence fails. The interpretation of this choice of P1 is that agent 1 is optimistic in
the sense that he does not believe the dividend process can fall below one. In equilibrium,
therefore, we expect agent 1 to attempt to exploit what he perceives as the unnecessarily
cautious behavior of agent 2. In view of Example 1, the equilibrium quantities are easily
computed:
Proposition 5. The equilibrium market prices of risk for the two agents are given by
θ1t = θt +
vDt
Dt − 1
, θ2t = θt,
where
(4.2) θt = v − 1{t<τ1}
vDt
Dt − 1 +
w2
w1
(D0 − 1)
.
The equilibrium interest rate is given by
rt = ρ− vθt,
and the stock price is
St = Dtη(t),
with η(t) as in (2.18). In particular, the stock price volatility is v > 0, so that the market is
complete.
Note that the “reference” market price of risk θt is bounded, which means that the same is
true for the second agent’s subjective market price of risk θ2t. However, the first (optimistic)
agent’s market price of risk explodes to +∞ as t increases to τ1. As will be shown below,
this has consequences for the investment behavior of agent 1 close to τ1.
Next, the sign of θ2t prior to τ1 depends on the relative initial wealth of the two agents.
Indeed, it follows from (4.5) that for t < τ1, θ2t > 0 holds if and only if w1/w2 < D0 − 1.
Thus, if the optimistic agent dominates the economy from the outset, then the growth
potential of the stock price becomes so strong that agent 2 is willing to sustain negative
compensation (in effect, to pay) for investing in the stock. On the other hand, the interest
rate moves in the opposite direction, meaning that investors require high yields in order
to put money in the riskless asset. If on the other hand we have w1/w2 > D0 − 1, then
θ2t < 0.
From the point of view of the optimistic agent 1, things look different. His subjective market
price of risk θ1t is always positive, regardless of the initial wealth distribution. Moreover,
agent 1 will view the equilibrium interest rate as too high. To see this, we apply Itoˆ’s formula
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to derive the dynamics of the state price density of agent 1, given by ξ1t = ξ1/Z1t. The result
is
dξ1t
ξ1t
= −
∫ t
0
(ρ− vθ1s) ds +
∫ t
0
θ⊤1sdXs.
Hence, from the optimistic agent’s perspective, the correct interest rate should be ρ− vθ1t.
This differs from the interest rate that actually prevails in equilibrium, which satisfies
rt = ρ− vθt = (ρ− vθ1t)−
v2Dt
Dt − 1
.
The perceived mis-specification of the interest rate explodes as t increases to τ1, which we
interpret as a statement about the relative size of the bubble on the stock and the bubble
on the riskless asset, as perceived by agent 1: the bubble on the riskless asset is larger
in relative terms. This intuition is supported by the following result, which deals with
equilibrium trading strategies.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium strategy of the k:th agent (k = 1, 2) is given by(
φkt
πkt
)
=Wkt
(
1− θkt/v
θkt/v
)
, 0 ≤ t < τk.
Moreover, we have, P-a.s.,
lim
t↑τ1
π1t = − lim
t↑τ1
φ1t =
w1
w2
(D0 − 1)
−1Sτ1 on {τ1 ≤ T}.
This result clearly shows how agent 1 attempts to exploit the perceived bubbles. Both the
stock and the riskless asset carry bubbles, so ideally agent 1 would like to sell both these
assets short. However, due to the admissibility requirement of maintaining nonnegative
wealth such a strategy is infeasible. Instead, agent 1 short sells one of the assets (in this
example, the riskless assets), while maintaining a long position in the other asset (the stock)
in order to guarantee admissibility. Such collateralized trades are discussed in detail in
(Hugonnier, 2012, Section 3). The fact that he goes short in the riskless asset and long
in the stock confirms the previous intuition that the riskless asset has a larger bubble. It
is also consistent with the interpretation of agent 1 as being optimistic about Dt. In fact,
Proposition 6 leads us to refine our interpretation of the beliefs of agent 1: he is optimistic
about the performance of the stock dividends, relative to the performance of the riskless
asset.
Proposition 6 also shows that while the proportions of wealth invested in the two assets
explode as t increases to τ1, this behavior is caused by the vanishing denominator. The
numerators, i.e. the amounts held in the two assets, are well-behaved in the sense that they
converge to something finite. The net value of this limiting portfolio is zero. However, at
every instant strictly prior to τ1, agent 1 is convinced that his highly levered position will
ultimately result in a profit, and for this reason he continues to trade until his wealth reaches
zero. The offsetting positions he then holds in the stock (long) and risk-free asset (short)
amount to a loan from agent 2 that was used to buy shares of the stock. At τ1 agent 1
is forced to liquidate this position, effectively handing over his stock holdings to agent 2,
thereby closing out the loan.
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Finally, let us comment on the question of equivalent martingale measures and absence of
arbitrage. Since we clearly have positive bubbles under P1, the discussion in Section 3.1
implies that no equivalent local martingale measure can exist relative to P1. On the other
hand, the market price of risk of agent 2 is bounded, which implies that an equivalent true
martingale measure exists relative to P2.
4.2. One risky asset, the first agent pessimistic. The previous example can easily be
modified to yield a situation where agent 1 is pessimistic: Take D0 < 1, let τ1 be defined
by (4.1), and set
Z1t =
1−Dt∧τ1
1−D0
as before. Endowing agent 1 with beliefs P1 given by dP1 = Z1TdP, he will then assign zero
probability to the event that the dividend process rise above one. Propositions 5 and 6 still
hold verbatim; however, D0 − 1 is now negative rather than positive, as is Dt− 1 for t < τ1.
Consequently, the market price of risk of the pessimistic agent 1 will now explode to −∞
as t increases to τ1. Moreover, writing the expressions for the limiting optimal amounts of
agent 1 (see Proposition 6) as
lim
t↑τ1
π1t = − lim
t↑τ1
φ1t = −
w1
w2
(1−D0)
−1Sτ1 on {τ1 ≤ T},
we see that the pessimistic agent will attempt to exploit the (perceived) bubbles by short
selling the stock rather than the riskless asset. This is again consistent with our interpretation
of the beliefs of the first agent as pessimism regarding the performance of the stock dividends
relative to the riskless asset.
4.3. One risky asset, both agents perceive bubbles. In this example we consider an
economy with one risky asset and two agents, where the beliefs structure is such that both
agents simultaneously see a bubble. This is achieved by letting agent 1 be optimistic as
before, and assuming that agent 2 operates under the belief that large downward movements
of the dividend process are impossible. These “large downward movements” will be quantified
via relative drawdowns. An interesting additional feature of the resulting economy is that the
subjective bubble perceived initially by agent 1 may burst before agent 2 goes bankrupt.
Now to the specifics. We let X be Brownian motion under P, v > 0, D0 > 1, and define
Dt = D0 exp
(
vXt −
v2
2
t
)
,
as well as
τ1 = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Dt = 1}, Z1t =
Dt∧τ1 − 1
D0 − 1
, dP1 = Z1TdP.
The beliefs of agent 2 are given as follows. The relative drawdown of the dividend process is
defined by
rDDt = 1−
Dt
D∗t
, where D∗t = max
0≤s≤t
Ds.
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Fix a constant κ ∈ (0, 1) and let τ2 be the first time the relative drawdown reaches 1 − κ.
Equivalently, this is the first time the dividend process becomes a fraction κ of the level of
its running maximum. That is, we have
(4.3) τ2 = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : rDDt = 1− κ} = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Dt = κD
∗
t }.
The beliefs of agent 2 are now given via the corresponding density process.
Lemma 1. Define a process Z2 by
Z2t =
Dt∧τ2 − κD
∗
t∧τ2
(1− κ)D0
(
D∗t∧τ2
D0
) κ
1−κ
.
Then we have
(4.4) τ2 = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Z2t = 0}.
Moreover, Z2 is a martingale on [0, T ] and satisfies
Z2t = 1 +
∫ t
0
Z2s1{s<τ2}
dDs
Ds − κD∗s
.
We now set dP2 = Z2TdP. Under these beliefs, agent 2 will view a relative drawdown of
1− κ or more as impossible.
At this point we should pause and emphasize that P(max(τ1, τ2) ≤ T ) > 0 holds, in violation
of Assumption 1. As remarked earlier, this is easily remedied by replacing P by P˜ = (P1 +
P2)/2, for instance. Moreover, the specific choice of P˜ does not influence the resulting interest
rate, agent-specific market prices of risk, or equilibrium stock prices. The bubble components
perceived by each agent are also independent of the choice of P˜. We may therefore carry out
all computations as usual using the original measure P, for all times t < max(τ1, τ2). With
this in mind, the equilibrium quantities can now be found.
Proposition 7. The equilibrium market prices of risk for the two agents are given by
θ1t = θt +
vDt
Dt − 1
, θ2t = θt +
vDt
Dt − κD∗t
,
where, for t < max(τ1, τ2),
(4.5) θt = v −
vDt
w1Z1t + w2Z2t
(
w1
D0 − 1
1{t<τ1} +
w2
(1− κ)D0
(
D∗t
D0
) κ
1−κ
1{t<τ2}
)
The equilibrium interest rate is given by
rt = ρ− vθt,
and the stock price is
St = Dtη(t),
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with η(t) as in (2.18). In particular, the stock price volatility is v > 0, so that the market is
complete. The equilibrium trading strategies are given by the expressions in Proposition 6,
and we have the following limiting holdings in the stock.
lim
t↑τ1
π1t =
w1
w2
Sτ1
Z2τ1
1
D0 − 1
on {τ1 < τ2}, P-a.s.(4.6)
lim
t↑τ2
π2t =
w2
w1
Sτ2
Z1τ2
κ
1− κ
(
D0
D∗τ2
) κ
1−κ
−1
on {τ2 < τ1}, P-a.s.(4.7)
Qualitatively the behavior is similar to the previous examples: the subjective market prices
of risk explode close to the respective bankruptcy time (both to +∞ in this example). The
same thing holds for the optimal fractions invested in the stock and in the riskless asset.
For each agent k, the optimal fraction held in the riskless asset tends to −∞ close to τk,
which means that both agents hope to exploit the bubble on the riskless asset. This is
consistent with the fact that they both are optimistic about the dividend process: agent 1
thinks it cannot drop below one, while agent 2 believes that a large drop relative to its
all-time maximum is impossible.
Let us comment on the subjective stock price bubbles appearing in this example. They are
given by
(4.8) Bkt =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T∧max(τ1,τ2)
τk
ξsDsds
]
, t < τk, Pk-a.s.
Since we have both P(τ1 < τ2) > 0 and P(τ2 < τ1) > 0, it follows directly that both
agents perceive a nonzero bubble at time 0. Moreover, the bubble perceived by agent 1 will
disappear when agent 2 goes bankrupt at time τ2. Similarly, the bubble perceived by agent 2
disappears at time τ1. However, there is a different, rather undramatic way in which the
subjective bubble seen by agent 1 can burst. To see this, consider the stopping time
σ = inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : D∗t =
1
κ
}
.
If σ occurs while both agents are still present in the economy, i.e. on the event {σ < τ1∧ τ2},
we necessarily have τ2 ≤ τ1. Indeed, for t ≥ σ we have D
∗
t ≥ 1/κ, which means that if the
dividend process is to fall down to Dt = 1, it must first pass the level κD
∗
t , triggering τ2.
This shows that τ2 ≤ τ1 on {σ < τ1 ∧ τ2}. Consequently, by (4.8), we have
B1t = 0, t ∈ [σ, T ], P1-a.s. on {σ < τ1 ∧ τ2}.
On the other hand, strictly prior to σ, both agents see strictly positive bubbles. To summa-
rize, we have shown how a bubble (perceived by one of the agents) may burst at some time
strictly prior to all bankruptcy times.
4.4. Two risky assets, both agents optimistic. The last example considers an economy
with two risky assets, where both agents condition components of both dividend processes
to be large. This leads to a situation where they both perceive bubbles on the assets,
although they disagree about the size of the bubble at any given moment. Interestingly,
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their perceptions of the statistical properties of the aggregate bubble may coincide under
certain conditions.
We model the aggregate dividend under P as a geometric Brownian motion with drift,
Dt = D0 exp
{
v⊤Xt +
(
a−
1
2
‖v‖2
)
t
}
,
where v = (v1, v2) ∈ R2, a ∈ R, and X = (X1, X2) is two-dimensional standard Brownian
motion under P. The individual dividend processes are then modeled as fractions of the
aggregate dividend,
Dit = ψitDt, i = 1, 2,
where the fractions ψ1, ψ2 are given by
ψ1t = ψ10 +
∫ t
0
ψ1s(1− ψ1s)v
⊤
ψdXs, ψ2t = 1− ψ1t,
for some vector vψ ∈ R
2 and ψ10 ∈ (0, 1). The above stochastic differential equation for ψ1
has a unique strong solution valued in the open unit interval (0, 1), see (Menzly et al., 2004).
It is therefore guaranteed that the dividend processes are well-defined and strictly positive.
In particular, Itoˆ’s formula implies that each Di satisfies
(4.9)
dDit
Dit
=
(
v + (−1)i−1(1− ψit)vψ
)⊤
dXt +
(
a+ (−1)i−1(1− ψit)v
⊤vψ
)
dt.
To define the two agents’ beliefs, we set
τk = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : Xkt = −1}, Zkt = 1 +Xk, t∧τk , k = 1, 2,
and define dP1 = Z1TdP and dP2 = Z2TdP. An application of Girsanov’s theorem gives the
following result, which shows how the two agents perceive the dividend processes.
Proposition 8. The bivariate process
X1t =
(
X11t
X12t
)
=
(
X1t −
∫ t
0
1
1+X1s
ds
X2t
)
is Brownian motion under P1. Similarly, the bivariate process
X2t =
(
X21t
X22t
)
=
(
X1t
X2t −
∫ t
0
1
1+X2s
ds
)
is Brownian motion under P2. The dividend processes D1 and D2 satisfy
dDit
Dit
=
(
v + (−1)i−1(1− ψit)vψ
)⊤
dXkt
+
(
a + (−1)i−1(1− ψit)v
⊤vψ + (v + (−1)
i−1(1− ψit)vψ)
⊤ek
1
1 +Xkt
)
dt
under Pk, where ek is the k:th unit vector in R
2.
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Comparing the statement of Proposition 8 with Equation (4.9), we see that the drift of
D1 and D2 is greater under both P1 and P2 than under P, provided the componentwise
inequalities
v + vψ > 0 and v − vψ > 0
are satisfied. In this sense the agents are both optimistic. Note that as in the previous
example we have P(max(τ1, τ2) ≤ T ) > 0 holds, in violation of Assumption 1. As remarked
earlier, we may still work under P, as long as we take care only to consider times t <
max(τ1, τ2).
Proposition 9. The equilibrium market price of risk for the two agents are given by
θkt = θt +
1
1 +Xkt
ek, t < τk,
where
θt = v −
1
w1(1 +X1t∧τ1) + w2(1 +X2t∧τ2)
(
1{t<τ1}w1
1{t<τ2}w2
)
, t < max(τ1, τ2).
The equilibrium interest rate is given by
rt = ρ+ a− v
⊤θt.
Note that neither the market prices of risk, nor the interest rate are bounded in this exam-
ple.
We finish with a result showing that under certain circumstances, both agents may agree
about the (unconditional) distribution of the aggregate bubble. In other words, the two
agents not only agree about the presence of a bubble on the market portfolio, but also about
its statistical properties.
Proposition 10. Assume v = (1, 1) and w1 = w2 = w. Then the bubble on the market
portfolio perceived by agent k is given by
B
k
t =
w
ξtη(0)
∫ T
0
P(τk ≤ s | Ft)e
−ρsds, t < τk,
Moreover, the law of the process B
1
under P1 coincides with the law of the process B
2
under P2.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model, whose only departure from the standard
paradigm is the beliefs structure, where agents disagree about zero probability events. The
first contribution is to show that an equilibrium can exist in such a setting. In particular, we
address potential consistency problems related to the fact that an agent should be able to
revise his beliefs if an event occurs that was initially thought to be impossible. The resolution
originates with the fact that the agent necessarily becomes insolvent at any such time.
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The second contribution is to show that asset pricing bubbles arise naturally in this model.
The bubbles are subjective in the sense that they are perceived by some, but not necessarily
all, agents, and that different agents may attribute different portions of the equilibrium
prices to bubbles. All previous models where bubbles occur in equilibrium require portfolio
restrictions in addition to a standard solvency constraint. In the present paper no such
additional restrictions are imposed; instead the bubbles are caused by the disagreement
about nullsets.
Several explicit examples are analyzed in order to illustrate some of the phenomena that
can occur. In particular, it is shown how agents attempt to exploit perceived bubbles via
collateralized long-short strategies. Moreover, all agents may simultaneously see bubbles,
and they can even agree about the unconditional distribution of the bubble on the market
portfolio. Bubbles can burst when some agent becomes bankrupt, but also at earlier points
in time.
Appendix A. Proofs
The following lemma is a Bayes’ rule for non-equivalent probability measures. It is a key
mathematical tool used in this paper.
Lemma 2. Consider a probability measure P˜ ≪ P, define Z = dP˜
dP
, and let G ⊂ F be a
sub-σ-field. Then for any P˜-integrable random variable Y we have
E˜ [Y | G ] =
1
E[Z | G ]
E [ZY | G ] on {E[Z | G ] > 0}, P-a.s.,
where E˜[ · ] denotes expectation under P˜. In particular, defining A = {E[Z | G ] > 0}, it
follows that E˜ [Y | G ] 1A is P-a.s. uniquely defined.
Proof. The proof is similar as in the case of equivalent measures. Details can be found, for
instance, in (Larsson, 2012, Lemma 12). 
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are standard, and rely on the fact that martingale
representation under P implies martingale representation under Pk ≪ P. An outline of the
proofs are given for the sake of completeness.
Proof of Proposition 1. The argument proceeds as in the standard case (see (Karatzas and
Shreve, 1998, Theorem 3.5), for instance), once we know that any Pk-martingale can be
written as the stochastic integral with respect to Xk = X −
∫
Z−1s d〈X,Zk〉s, which is n-
dimensional Brownian motion under Pk. This is true by (Jacod and Shiryaev, 2003, Theo-
rem III.5.24). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix a utility function u(·) and let A (w) be the set of all consumption
plans c ≥ 0 that are P-feasible given initial wealth w. Since E[
∫ T
0
ξtctdt] ≤ ξ0w for any
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c ∈ A (w) by Proposition 1, we have, for any y ≥ 0,
sup
c∈A (w)
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρtuk(ct)dt
]
≤ sup
c∈A (w)
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρtu(ct)dt
]
− y
(
E
[∫ T
0
ξtctdt
]
− ξ0w
)
= sup
c∈A (w)
E
[∫ T
0
(
e−ρtu(ct)− yξtct
)
dt
]
+ yξ0w
≤ E
[∫ T
0
(
e−ρtu(cyt )− yξtc
y
t
)
dt
]
+ yξ0w
= E
[∫ T
0
e−ρtu(cyt )dt
]
− y
(
E
[∫ T
0
ξtc
y
tdt
]
− ξ0w
)
,
where cyt = (u
′)−1(yξte
ρt) is the pointwise maximizer of the function x 7→ e−ρtu(x) − yξtx.
Now choose y ≥ 0 so that E[
∫ T
0
ξtc
y
tdt] = ξ0w. The Inada conditions imply that this is always
possible. Then cy ∈ A (w) by Proposition 1, and we obtain
sup
c∈A (w)
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρtuk(ct)dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
e−ρtu(cyt )dt
]
.
Hence cy is optimal. The same argument goes through with P, ξ, and u(·) replaced by Pk,
ξk, and uk(·), respectively, except that we now define c
y
t = (u
′
k)
−1(yξkte
ρt)1{t<τk}. This
gives (2.11). The Pk ⊗ dt-a.e. uniqueness follows from the strict concavity of the mapping
c 7→ Uk(c). The form (2.12) of the wealth process is a consequence of Proposition 1 and the
optimality of cy. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Since ck is optimal, the first order condition (2.11) together with the
uniqueness assertion in Proposition 2 yields ckt = Ik(yke
ρtξt/Zkt) for a.e. t < τk, Pk-a.s.
By (2.1) this also holds P-a.s. The statement about ck now follows because min0≤t≤T ξt > 0
and limt↑τk Zkt = 0, P-a.s., and limy→∞ Ik(y) = 0.
Now consider Wk. Again using (2.1) we deduce that the equality in (2.12) holds for 0 ≤ t <
τk, P-a.s. Hence for t < τk we have, P-a.s.,
Wkt =
1
ξkt
Ekt
[∫ T
t
ξkscksds
]
=
1
ξkt
∫ T
t
Ekt
[
1{s<τk}ξkscks
]
ds
=
1
ξkt
∫ T
t
1
Zkt
Et
[
Zks1{s<τk}ξkscks
]
ds
=
1
ξt
Et
[∫ τk
t
ξscksds
]
.(A.1)
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Here the second equality uses Pk(s < τk) = 1 and Tonelli’s theorem, the third uses Bayes’
rule (Lemma 2), and the last equality uses that ξt = ξktZkt for t < τk. We deduce
ξtWkt = Et
[∫ τk
0
ξscksds
]
−
∫ t
0
ξscksds, t < τk, P-a.s.
Together with the positivity of ξt and the fact that all martingales are continuous, this yields
the claim about Wk. 
Proof of Proposition 3. By hypothesis, the self-financing property (2.10) holds with µk and
Pk replaced by µ and P, respectively. Itoˆ’s formula then implies that ξtWt +
∫ t
0
ξscsds is
local martingale, and hence a supermartingale since it is nonnegative. Thus ξtWt is also a
supermartingale, and therefore absorbed once it reaches zero (by Corollary 1 this happens
at τk.) By positivity of ξt, the same holds for Wt. It then follows that
∫ t
τk
ξscsds = 0 for all
t ∈ [τk, T ], P-a.s., which implies that ct is zero there, at least up to P⊗ dt-a.e. equivalence.
Returning to (2.10), we see that σ⊤t πt = 0, and hence πt = 0, on [τk, T ], P ⊗ dt-a.e. This
finally yields φt =Wt − π
⊤
t 1 = 0, and part (i) is proved.
For part (ii), simply note (using (2.9) and Proposition (2)) that
E
[∫ T
0
ξtcktdt
]
=
∫ T
0
E
[
ξtckt1{t<τk}
]
dt = Ek
[∫ T
0
ξktcktdt
]
= wk.
Hence ck is P-feasible (with initial wealth wk) due to Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The individual wealth processes are determined by Propositions 2
and 3. Using also the equality (A.1) we find that they satisfy
(A.2) Wkt =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T
t
ξscksds
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P-a.s.
(Recall that ckt = 0 for t ≥ τk.) But any equilibrium stock prices must satisfy W1t +
· · · +WKt = St, which yields the expression (2.16) for the market portfolio. Furthermore,
ξtSt +
∫ t
0
ξsDsds is a true martingale, and this will imply (2.15). Indeed, for each i, ξtSit +∫ t
0
ξsDisds is a (nonnegative) local martingale, hence a true martingale since it is dominated
by the martingale ξtSt +
∫ t
0
ξsDsds. Since also 0 ≤ SiT ≤ ST = 0, we deduce (2.15). To see
that Sit is indeed of the form (2.5), we write
ξtSit +
∫ t
0
ξsDisds = Et
[∫ T
0
ξsDisds
]
= S0 +
∫ t
0
ϑ⊤s dXs
for some X-integrable process ϑ whose existence is guaranteed by the martingale represen-
tation theorem. Integrating 1/ξ against the left and right sides above and rearranging terms
(and using the positivity of Si) leads to an expression of the form (2.5). 
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Proof for Example 1. Since uk(·) = log(·) for all k we have Φ(ξ; ν1, . . . , νK) = ξ
−1(ν1 + · · ·+
νK), and hence by (2.14),
ξt =
1
Dt
e−ρt
(
1
y1
Z1t + · · ·+
1
yK
ZKt
)
.
This is certainly a nonnegative semimartingale, and it is strictly positive under Assumption 1.
As usual in the logarithmic setting, the constant yk can be computed explicitly using the
requirement that the budget constraint be binding, together with the first order condition.
Indeed,
wk = E
[∫ T
0
ξscksds
]
=
1
yk
∫ T
0
e−ρsE[Zks]ds =
1− e−ρT
ykρ
,
so that yk = η(0)/wk. This gives (2.17). Furthermore, using the martingale property (un-
der P) of the Zk, we deduce from (2.16) and (2.17) that
St = Dt
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)ds = Dtη(t),
which is (2.19). Equation (2.20) follows directly from Proposition 2. Together with (2.12)
this yields, for t < τk,
Wkt =
1
ξkt
Ekt
[∫ T
t
1
ykeρs
ds
]
= cktη(t).
Note that this expression is valid also for t ≥ τk due to the No Resurrection property, which
gives (2.21). To prove (2.23), first note that the aggregate dividend is given by
Dt = D0E
(∫
asds +
∫
v⊤s dXs
)
t
,
which implies
1
Dt
=
1
D0
E
(
−
∫
(as − ‖vs‖
2)ds−
∫
v⊤s dXs
)
t
.
Therefore, by Yor’s formula,
ξt =
w1 + · · ·+ wK
D0η(0)
e−ρtE
(
−
∫
(as − ‖vs‖
2)ds−
∫
v⊤s dXs
)
t
E
(∫
γ⊤s dXs
)
t
=
w1 + · · ·+ wK
D0η(0)
E
(
−
∫
(ρ+ as − ‖vs‖
2 + v⊤s γs)ds−
∫
(vs − γs)
⊤dXs
)
t
.
From this expression we simply read off rt and θt. Finally, (2.24)–(2.25) follow from the fact
that Zk is a nonnegative martingale that reaches zero at τk. Equation (2.26) then follows
from Itoˆ’s formula together with the equality ξkt = ξt/Zkt, t < τk. 
Proof of Theorem 1. For t < τk, write
Ft(c) =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T
t
ξscsds
]
=
1
ξt
Et
[∫ τk
t
ξscsds
]
+
1
ξt
Et
[∫ T
τk
ξscsds
]
.
The same calculation as in (A.1) shows that the first term on the right side equals F kt (c).
This proves the theorem. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. The results follow from Example 1 after finding the processes γ and
γk appearing in (2.22) and (2.24). This is easily achieved via Itoˆ’s formula applied to the
“reference” state price density
ξt =
1
Dtη(0)
e−ρt
(
w1
Dt∧τ1 − 1
D0 − 1
+ w2
)
,
obtained via (2.17). 
Proof of Proposition 6. The optimal wealth process for agent k is given by (2.20) and (2.21).
Itoˆ’s formula and the fact that σt = v imply that πkt/Wkt = θkt/v, and hence φkt = 1−θkt/v,
for t < τk. To prove the statement about the limit of π1t and φ1t, first note that
lim
t↑τ1
π1t = lim
t↑τ1
(
W1t
θt
v
+W1t
Dt
Dt − 1
)
= lim
t↑τ1
W1t
Dt − 1
Dt,
since θt is bounded and limt↑τ1 W1t = 0. We now compute the limit on the right side. To
this end, note that (2.19), (2.21), (2.20), and (2.17) imply that for t < τ1, we have
(A.3)
W1t
St
=
ckt
Dt
=
w1Z1t
η(0)eρtξtDt
=
w1Z1t
w1Z1t + w2Z2t
.
Rearranging this equation and using the definition of Z1 and Z2 yields
St −W1t =
W1t
Z1t
w2
w1
Z2t =
W1t
Dt − 1
w2
w1
(D0 − 1).
Taking the limit as t ↑ τ1 we deduce
lim
t↑τ1
W1t
Dt − 1
=
w1
w2
(D0 − 1)
−1Sτ1 ,
which then yields the result since Dτ1 = 1. 
Proof of Lemma 1. It is clear from (4.3) that (4.4) holds. Furthermore, we have
Z2t ≤
D∗t∧τ2 − κD
∗
t∧τ2
(1− κ)D0
(
D∗t∧τ2
D0
) κ
1−κ
=
(
D∗t∧τ2
D0
) 1
1−κ
≤
(
D∗T
D0
) 1
1−κ
.
Since D is a positive martingale, the above bound together with Doob’s Lp-inequality for
p = 1/(1− κ) yields
(A.4) E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
Z2t
]
≤ D−p0 E
[
(D∗T )
p
]
≤ D−p0
(
p
p− 1
)p
E [DpT ] <∞.
The right side is finite since DT is log-normally distributed and hence have finite moments.
We can now prove that Z2 is a martingale, which will complete the proof of the lemma. To
this end, we will use (Cheridito et al., 2012, Lemma 2.4) (see also Equation (4.1) in the same
reference), which states that
(A.5) rDDt = −
∫ t
0
dDs
D∗s
+ logD∗t − logD0.
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Now, define two processes
Yt =
1
1− κ
(1− κ− rDDt∧τ2) , Λt =
1
1− κ
log
(
D∗t∧τ2
D0
)
.
Using the definition of rDDt one finds that
Z2t = e
ΛtYt.
Moreover, (A.5) yields
Yt = 1 +
1
1− κ
∫ t
0
1{s<τ2}
(
dDs
D∗s
− d logD∗s
)
,
so by the product rule we get
Z2t = 1 +
∫ t
0
Z2s1{s<τ2}
(
dΛs +
dYs
Ys
)
= 1 +
1
1− κ
∫ t
0
Z2s1{t<τ2}
(
d logD∗s −
d logD∗s
Ys
+
dDs
YsD∗s
)
.
But dD∗t , and hence d logD
∗
t , only charges the set {t : Dt = D
∗
t }, and on this set we have
Yt = 1. Hence the first two terms in the parentheses above cancel, and we arrive at
Z2t = 1 +
∫ t
0
Z2s1{s<τ2}
dDs
(1− κ)YsD∗s
= 1 +
∫ t
0
Z2s1{s<τ2}
dDs
Ds − κD∗s
.
It follows that Z2 is a local martingale, and hence a true martingale in view of (A.4). The
lemma is proved. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 6, so we omit most
details. Let us only indicate how to obtain the limits (4.6) and (4.7). Starting from (A.3)
(see the proof of Proposition 6) we obtain
lim
t↑τ1
W1t
Z1t
= lim
t↑τ1
w1
w2
St −W1t
Z2t
=
w1
w2
Sτ1
Z2τ1
on {τ1 < τ2},
and similarly
lim
t↑τ2
W2t
Z2t
=
w2
w1
Sτ2
Z1τ2
on {τ2 < τ1}.
Furthermore, we have the equalities
W1tDt
Dt − 1
=
W1t
Z1t
Dt
D0 − 1
, t < τ1,
and
W2tDt
Dt − κD∗t
=
W2t
Z2t
Dt
(1− κ)D0
(
D0
D∗t
) κ
1−κ
, t < τ2.
Combining these expressions, and using that limt↑τk Wktθt = 0 for k = 1, 2, we deduce
lim
t↑τ1
π1t = lim
t↑τ1
W1t
θ1t
v
= lim
t↑τ1
W1tDt
Dt − 1
=
w1
w2
Sτ1
Z2τ1
Dτ1
D0 − 1
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on {τ1 < τ2}, as well as
lim
t↑τ2
π2t = lim
t↑τ2
W2t
θ2t
v
= lim
t↑τ2
W2tDt
Dt − κD∗t
=
w2
w1
Sτ2
Z1τ2
Dτ2
(1− κ)D0
(
D0
D∗τ2
) κ
1−κ
on {τ2 < τ1}. Using also that Dτ1 = 1 and Dτ2 = κD
∗
τ2
gives (4.6) and (4.7). 
Proof of Proposition 8. This is a straightforward application of Girsanov’s theorem, see (Prot-
ter, 2005, Theorem III.41). 
Proof of Proposition 9. Just as the proofs of Propositions 5 and 7, this is an application of
the expressions given in Example 1. We omit the details. 
Proof of Proposition 10. The expression in Example 2 and the fact that Zkt = 1 + Xk,t∧τk
yield
B
k
t =
wℓ
ξtη(0)
Et
[∫ T
τk
e−ρs(1 +Xℓ,s∧τℓ)ds
]
, t < τk,
where ℓ 6= k. Since X1 and X2 are independent, we have
Et
[∫ T
τk
e−ρs(1 +Xℓ,s∧τℓ)ds
]
=
∫ T
0
Et
[
1{τk≤s}e
−ρs(1 +Xℓ,s∧τℓ)
]
ds
=
∫ T
0
P(τk ≤ s | Ft)e
−ρsds,
which gives the claimed expression for B
k
t . Next, again by the independence of X1 and
X2, we have that P(τk ≤ s | Ft) = F (s; t, Xk) for some functional F that depends on the
path of its last argument up to time t. Moreover, ξt depends on X1 and X2 only through
X1,t∧τ1 +X2,t∧τ2 . Since this expression is unaffected by a permutation of the indices 1 and 2,
it follows from Proposition 8 that the joint law of {X1,t∧τ1 +X2,t∧τ2 , X1t : t ∈ [0, T ]} under
P1 coincides with the joint law of {X1,t∧τ1 +X2,t∧τ2 , X2t : t ∈ [0, T ]} under P2. This finishes
the proof of the proposition. 
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